How does bribery affect public service delivery

This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form. If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roula I. Yazigi email available below. Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services. Economic literature: papers , articles , software , chapters , books. FRED data. My bibliography Save this paper. How does bribery affect public service delivery? When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price.

Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery"tax. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services.

Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. This prediction is, however, driven by the assumption … Expand. Abstract Corruption studies have suggested that corrupt politicians may win public support by providing substantial economic benefits to their citizens and that if a government works effectively to … Expand.

This paper provides an analysis of potential unequal burden of bribery in schools on poor households in developing countries. The rich are more likely to pay bribes in the standard model where the … Expand. View 4 excerpts, cites background. Use of social audits to examine unofficial payments in government health services: experience in South Asia, Africa, and Europe. How's Your Government? This article employs World Values Survey measures of life satisfaction as though they were direct measures of utility, and uses them to evaluate alternative features and forms of government in large … Expand.

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the payoffs to the client's decision. We test this framework using a new data set on … Expand.

View 2 excerpts, references background. Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the size of bribes received, and seek to … Expand. View 1 excerpt, references background.

Highly Influential. View 3 excerpts, references background. This Paper uses an unique data set on corruption containing quantitative information on estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms. The data has two striking features: not all firms report they need … Expand. By explicitly accounting for the interaction between importers and corrupt customs officials, the author argues that setting trade tariff rates at a uniform level, limits public official's ability to … Expand.

Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries. The relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design. Inability or unwillingness to curb corruption can therefore be seen as a failure by states to adequately provide for human rights — civil, political, economic, social and cultural, as well as the right to development — by depriving citizens access to public services.

This creates a greater divide and inequality in society as the wealthy can afford private services. There is, therefore, a compelling argument to consider the fight against corruption in service delivery as an integral part of the human rights-based approach to development. Corruption in service delivery is the form of corruption most frequently encountered by citizens, and can plague all kinds of interactions with the state.

As well as reducing the quantity of public resources available for redistributionary purposes, corruption undermines the quality of services. This can happen in a number of ways. Suppliers can use fraudulent or lower-grade inputs in infrastructure projects or essential supplies like pharmaceutical products, equipment or textbooks to increase their profit margin at the expense of intended beneficiaries.

Bribery and extortion at the point of delivery can render public services unaffordable for a large segment of the population, effectively depriving the poor of access to key basic services they are entitled to. Corruption in service delivery has been shown to have negative effects on poverty rates, [9] human development indicators, [10] mortality rates, [11] child mortality rates, [12] school drop-out rates, [13] trust in governments, [14] and civil unrest.

The world's poor are disproportionally affected by the impact of corruption on public services.